
















































We examine the evolution of decentralized clearinghouse mechanisms from the
13th to the 18th century; in particular, we explore the clearing of non- or limited-
tradable debts like bills of exchange. We construct a theoretical model of these clear-
inghouse mechanisms, similar to the models in the theoretical matching literature, and
show that specific decentralized multilateral clearing algorithms known as rescontre,
skontrieren or virement des parties used by merchants were efficient in specific histor-
ical contexts. We can explain both the evolutionary self-organizing emergence of late
medieval and early modern fairs, and its robustness during the 17th and 18th century.
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1 Introduction
Late medieval Europe was characterized by a revival of trade among the regions of the con-
tinent and the emergence of complementary trade-related innovations, a time commonly
characterized as the Commercial Revolution (Lopez 1976). Merchants travelled with their
goods from one city to the next and many fair locations emerged where traders from dif-
ferent parts of Europe met (Verlinden 1971; Blockmans 1996). An important step in the
evolution of trade was the separation of the quid and quo (Greif 2002, 2006). This means
that the payment for purchased goods no longer took place at the same time and place but
at the next fair or market, either at the same or at a different location. Alongside this de-
velopment appeared financial instruments like the cambium, letter obligatory, or the bill of
exchange, which were orders or promises of future payment at a specific time and place,
typically during the payment days at the end of a fair, by the drawer or his representative
or banker (Goldschmidt 1891; Schapps 1892; de Roover 1953). This was very useful for
a merchant, since he could negotiate a time and place when and where he expected to be
liquid again, for example after the successful trading of goods or when he expected to cash
in bills himself. Cashless payment was a good alternative to carrying heavy gold or silver
coins along dangerous trading routes. In addition, it limited the dependency of merchants
on the currency policies of local dukes. Finally, the use of cashless payment helped to over-
come the money shortage during the Later Middle Ages due to the scarcity of silver and
gold bullion (Miskimin 1984; Spufford 1988). The only downside was the limited tradabil-
ity of the financial instruments (Usher 1943; Van der Wee 1963; North 1981; Munro 1994;
for a discussion see Boerner and Ritschl 2006, 2009).
As a consequence of this development, a need for the settlement of liabilities, typi-
cally at the end of a fair or market period, arose. Merchants and merchant bankers met to
settle bills of exchange and other liabilities to balance their positions. At fairs and mar-
ket locations, permanent payment days were established over time and, during the 16th
century, exclusive clearing fairs in Besancon and later Piacenza and Novi were estab-
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lished where mainly bills of exchange were settled from all over Europe (Endemann 1885;
Neuhaus 1892; Ehrenberg 1896; Vigne 1903; Haristoy 1906; Prausnitz 1928; Carande
1943; Lapeyre 1955; Da Silva 1969; Gascon 1971; Boyer-Xambeu et. al.1986; Denzel
1994, 2009). At these late medieval and early modern markets and fairs a specific decen-
tralized multilateral clearing algorithm to offset non-tradable credits with debts was devel-
oped. This netting procedure is known in the sources as rescontrire, rescontre, skontrieren,
or vivre compte / des parties.
In a nutshell, the procedure worked as follows: all merchants met on fixed days at the
end of the market or fair, everybody revealed his debtors, and creditors had to confirm
their liabilities. Then, merchants tried to offset credits with debts through a decentralized
searching and matching procedure: in the first step, they cancelled reciprocal debts, in the
second step, they used clearing cycles, and, in the third and final step, they using clearing
chains. At the end, still unbalanced positions had to be paid in cash or new bills had to be
drawn.
This clearing mechanism developed at late medieval fairs and was perfected at the finan-
cial fairs of the late 16th and early 17th century, where it developed into a formal procedure
embedded in a legal framework. This was the dominant debt-clearing mechanism in Eu-
rope’s most important trade centres: Germany, Italy, France, the Low Countries, and Spain.
These markets and fairs not only built the central nodes of European finance and trade but
also acquired capital to finance trade with the New World. (Ehrenberg 1896, Da Silva 1969,
Boyer-Xambeu et. al.1986; van der Wee 1993, Pezzolo and Tattaro 2008, Denzel 2009).
It waned in importance when the first exchange banks took over the clearing business
and general endorsement of bills of exchange during the 17th century (Schneider 1989;
Bru¨bach 1994). Nevertheless, there is strong evidence that this decentralized procedure
was still in use at many markets and fairs during the 17th and 18th century. In addition,
traders who worked under the first stock exchange markets used the same technique to
offset payments for stocks or future contracts in cities like Amsterdam and London (Parker
3
1974; Gelderbloom and Jonker 2005). After the establishment of the London Clearing
Club in 1775, banks began settling their liabilities in a similar way (Seyd 1872). Thus this
decentralized multilateral clearing algorithm was the backbone of financial clearing during
more than 500 years of pre-industrial growth in Europe.
The research questions of interest are 1) why such clearing mechanisms came into ex-
istence and 2) why they were so successful for several hundred years. Of course, these
clearing mechanisms reduced the need for cash. However, these mechanisms had to have
achieved a high clearing rate. On the one hand, merchant books and contemporary wit-
nesses document that the mechanism was quite successful. On the other hand, legal docu-
ments give evidence that merchants were more or less forced to participate in these mech-
anisms and were not allowed to pay in cash. In addition, there is evidence that merchants
had preferences over the choice of their clearing partners and the clearing order.
Not much attention has been paid to the microstructure of this clearing mechanism so
far. Legal and economic historians focused on the description, not on institutional analysis.
These authors did not come to a clear conclusion about the clearing efficiency. While
they recognised the use of the clearing technology for cashless payment all over Europe
to generate credit and solve problems of money shortage (Neuhaus 1892; Ehrenberg 1896;
Boyer-Xambieu 1986; Bru¨bach 1986; M. North. 1996; Denzel 2005, 2009), a valuation of
the clearing mechanism has been missing or efficiency has been assumed simply because
of the success of the mechanism. Alternatively, it has been argued that the mechanism was
inefficient because the clearing was decentralized and looked rather complicated.
In contrast to these approaches we use a theory-guided approach (Greif 1993, 2006,
Greif et al. 1994) to study the efficiency of the settlement mechanism. We analyze the main
characteristics of the clearing procedure and develop a theoretical model of the mechanism
and proceed to analyze its properties. We examine the matching and clearing of non-
tradable assets which are complementary in utility to each other when matched efficiently.
This modelling goes back to allocation methods using the successive removal of cycles,
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which were first proposed by Shapley and Scarf (1974) for the housing allocation problem
and subsequently studied by researchers such as Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (2002), and
Ehlers (2002). Recently, Alvin Roth et al. (2004; 2005) applied these techniques to the
kidney exchange problem.
We show that the functioning of these mechanisms depends on the balance of posi-
tions (credits and debts) of merchants ex ante and the use of clearing cycles or clearing
chains. If positions are balanced, then efficient clearing is always achievable with clearing
cycles and also with clearing chains. If positions are unbalanced, and only cycles are used,
then depending on the ordering of the cycles different levels of clearing efficiencies can be
achieved, and some agents may have both credits and debts at the end. However, if chains
are used, each merchant will be reduced to his net position. However, depending on the
clearing order, the distribution of debt transfers among merchants differs ex post. These
properties can lead to strategic behavior of merchants in the form of strategic misrepresen-
tation of information and an unwillingness to participate in specific cycles or chains. This
can reduce the efficiency of the clearing.
Consequently, the clearing efficiency depends on the willingness of the merchants to
participate in the clearing mechanism in general and the willingness to participate in spe-
cific cycles or chains in particular, and these both depend on the expected balance of the
positions and the enforcement of unbalanced positions ex post. This enforcement can be
achieved through reputation effects or through legal enforcement. Finally, in unbalanced
positions, the liquidity of the market after the mutual clearing has been done is important;
the ability to draw new bills on future clearing locations increases the willingness to partici-
pate ex ante although the merchants expect that positions will be unbalanced ex post. Thus,
if merchants are willing to participate in the mechanism all gross positions can be cleared
to the net positions by a decentralized search and matching mechanism independent of the
ordering of the use of bilateral clearing, cycles, or chains.
These results can explain the self-organizing emergence of this mechanism during the
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late Middle Ages in fairs and financial markets and why during the early modern period a
specific form of this mechanism embedded in a legal framework evolved all over Europe. In
addition, it can be shown why the mechanism was generally robust and only vulnerable in
cases of strong economic shocks or of political abuse. This made it difficult for competing
institutions such as the public exchange banks to take over the clearing business.
The remainder of the paper is structured the following way: Section 2 examines the
history of the mechanism, from its early development in the late Middle Ages to its per-
fection in the 16th and 17th century. In addition, the role of exchange banks, endorsement
of bills of exchange, the emergence of the mechanism on the first stock exchanges, and the
use of the mechanism in the form of clearing clubs among banks are discussed. Section
3 studies the mechanism more formally. A theoretical game model is set up which ana-
lyzes the algorithm; the equilibrium outcomes are discussed. In Section 4 the theoretical
predicted outcomes are discussed in their historical context. Both the successes and the
vulnerabilities of the mechanism are elaborated in detail. Section 5 concludes. The proofs
of propositions in Section 3 may be found in the Appendix.
2 Historical Development
Section 2 gives a comprehensive historical analysis of the mechanism: Section 2.1 de-
scribes the early development until the 16th century, and the formation of the formal proce-
dure and legislation during the 16th and early 17th century, Section 2.2 describes the rules
and customary practices, Section 2.3 details the further development, and finally Section
2.4 provides an evaluation of the efficiency based on descriptive source analysis.
2.1 Early Development and the Formation of a Formal Procedure
The evidence of the use debt clearing mechanisms such as rescontrire or rescontre can
be traced to the late Middle Ages. The first documents do not inform us about a detailed
structure or procedure of the clearing process, but just indicate its existence and probably
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its common use. The earliest sources are from Champagne fairs by the end of the 12th
and beginning of the 13th century (Anschu¨tz 1887, pp. 108f.; Haristoy 1906, pp. 284-
88; Face 1957). The use of mutual settlement at the central fair locations of Europe can
be again documented from the late 14th century and 15th century onwards: in Germany at
Frankfurt, Brunswick, and later Leipzig (Orth 1765, p. 446, Wolf 1967, p. 205f., Bu¨cher
1915, p. 212f. Bru¨bach 1994, p. 284, 307), in France at Lyon (Ehrenberg 1886, pp. 74-
8; Vinge 1903, pp. 110ff.; Haristoy 1906, pp. 296-301; Bresard 1914, Gascon 1971, pp.
242-8; Boyer-Xambeu 1986, pp. 189-198), in the Netherlands at Antwerp and Bergen op
Zoom (Ehrenberg 1896, pp. 10-13; van der Wee 1993, pp.151-158), and in Spain at the
Castilian fairs of Medina del Campo (Rodriguez and Fernandez 1903, pp. 642f.; Carande
1943, pp. 195-234.; Martin 1965, pp. LXXXII-CIII; Vasquez de Prada 1991, pp. 117f).
Early evidence from the 15th and 16th century can also be found in Mediterranean merchant
cities with permanent wholesaler markets and finance locations such as Barcelona, Genoa,
Naples, and Venice. (Capmany 1792, p. 167; Lattes 1869, pp 72; Ajello 1884, pp. 728ff.;
Prausnitz 1928, p. 11)
The common use of this clearing technology in many merchant cities and fair locations
during the 15th and 16th centuries was documented by the first regulations which describe
the clearing procedure in more detail by the end of the 16th century at the clearing fairs
of Piacenza. These regulations from 1597 were taken from the former clearing fairs of
Besancon and are called the orders of Besancon. This was the first exclusive clearing fair
and was founded by the Genoese in 1537 to compete with and replace the clearing fairs of
Lyon, which in turn go back to the second half of the 15th century. Because of this it has
been argued that the clearing procedure described in the statutes of Besancon goes back to
the customary practice applied by merchant bankers in Lyon.1 These orders from Besancon
have been recorded by Raphael Turri in 1642, who describes the clearing process in detail
1This argument goes back to Endemann 1886, p. 174. Customary practices of the 16th century Lyon fair
have been handed over by Fabiano 1556, Trenchant 1556, de Savonne 1567; de Rubys 1604. Later authors
are Boyer 1627 and Clerac 1656. See Vigne 1903, pp. 118-128; Haristoy 1906, pp. 296-301; Bresard 1914;
Gascon 1971, pp. 242-8.
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by himself. In addition, Peri 1638 and Sacchia 1645 also give descriptions of the clearing
process (Neuhaus 1892; Endemann 1885 174ff.; Ehrenberg 1896, pp. 230-6; Prausnitz
1928; Da Silva 1969, chapter 2).
The regulations can be seen as a blueprint of the procedures that can be found in many
exchange laws during the 17th and 18th century in Europe. Similar procedures can be found
in the fairs in Italy such as Novi, Bozen and Verona, which replaced Piacenza (Da Silva
1969; Denzel 2005, 2009). In France, Lyon kept on as the clearing centre for bills and other
obligations, where the procedures were codified in detail in 1667 based on earlier attempts
starting in 1642 (Haristoy 1906, pp. 303ff; Vigne 1903, pp. 118ff.). During the same time,
Frankfurt, the most important fair location and finance centre in Germany, produced its
first more detailed exchange law. This was inspired by the codification in Lyon. Whereas
Frankfurt had already a long tradition of using this clearing technique which goes back to
the late 14th century, clearing regulations could only be found in 1578, 1611, and finally
a more detailed version in 1666. (Bru¨bach 1994, pp. 169-76). Other important clearing
locations with regulations about the mechanism were Bruinswick 1686, 1715 and Leipzig
1682, 1711.2 Further evidence is available from merchant cities such as Augsburg, Breslau,
Nuremberg and others (Bru¨bach 1994, p. 318; Neuhaus 1892, p. 11).3
2.2 Regulations and Customary Practices
Clearing took place about four times a year. This goes back to the tradition that fairs
were held quarterly and at the end of each fair, a financial clearing was set.4 This pattern
can be documented for Lyon, the Brabant fairs with Antwerp and Bergen, the Castilian
fairs and all the Italian and most of the German fairs (Ehrenberg 1892, Da Silva 1969;
van der Wee; Boyer-Xambeu et al. 1986). In cities in which fairs became permanent
2Very short regulations for Leipzig existed in 1621 and 1676. See Hasse 1886, pp 277f.; Neuhaus 1892,
p. 11; Bru¨bach 1994, pp. 310ff.
3Beside the exchange law, contemporary writers like Raumburger (1723) and Riccius (1783) draw on
more evidence of the procedure in these places.
4For the typical fair’s customs, see Verlinden 1971.
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markets or when financial clearing was separated from goods trading, the frequency was
increased to monthly or even weekly meetings during the 17th and 18th century. This can be
documented in the regulations of Frankfurt 1776 and Leipzig 1688, or in Augsburg where
only a financial exchange was implemented (Neuhaus 1892, p. 11; Prausnitz 1928, p. 22;
Bru¨bach 1994, p. 175, 318).5 These clearing meetings lasted several days. In Besancon for
example it took eight days, always in a fixed ordering.
In most regulations there were no restrictions on participation. The clearing was open to
everybody, however de Turri reports that in Besancon participants were merchant bankers
and only they had the right to participate (Endemann 1889; p. 174, Prausnitz 1928, p. 17).
Scaccia and Peri write that whoever wanted to participate had to pay a deposit (Endemann
1889, p. 174; Neuhaus 1892, p. 13; Ehrenberg 1896, p. 231). Sometimes merchants
attending a fair were forced to take part in the clearing procedure. This was stipulated in the
regulations of Bozen and Leipzig (Neuhaus 1892, p. 31, 39).6 These rules excluded cash
payments or agreements about later payments ex ante by merchants who had not taken part
in the mutual clearing procedure. Under the rules of Besancon, merchants who wanted to
be paid in cash had to announce this at the beginning and had to seal the money (Ehrenberg
1892, p. 235; Prausnitz 1928; Neuhaus 1892). However de Turri, Scaccia, and Azorius,
another writer from 1625, report that merchants had preferences for mutual clearing and
were worried about receiving their payments in cash (Neuhaus 1892, p.19, 21; Endemann
1889, p. 179).
The clearing procedure worked the following way: merchant bankers met with their
ledgers (scartefacci). In early Besancon there were at least 50-60 bankers. In Piacenza
there were about 110 (Ehrenberg 1892, p. 229). Merchants who wanted to participate
had to be present or have an official representative. This can be found in the statutes of
Besancon and most of the later regulations during the 17th and 18th century (Endemann
5Permanent marketplaces document weekly meetings earlier on; for example, sources from Naples indi-
cate weekly meetings as early as the 16th century: See Ajello 1884, pp. 728ff.
6See also the report by Raumburger (1723).
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1885, p. 175 Bru¨bach 1994, pp. 306f.; Neuhaus 1892, p. 30; Haristoy 1906, p. 304f).
Once the set of participants had been determined, all creditors revealed their debtors.7 The
debtors had to confirm or reject the debts.8 In the next step, each banker had to create a
balance sheet with all the accepted claims, which had to be submitted in Besancon where
officials would check the general balance.9 This practice cannot be documented for other
fairs later on. Only accepted bills were taken in and were valid for the later mutual netting
procedure. Rejected bills were discussed in front of the fair court and settled later.10 This
regulation was also in use in all other fairs (Endemann 1885, p. 175ff; Prausnitz 1928, p.
17; Bru¨bach 1994, p. 309). De Turri writes that not all bankers were honest and hence
were willing to go in front of the court in order to settle some bills later (Endemann 1885,
p. 177).
In the next step the exchange rates for the bills were fixed in an official accounting
currency. This was done by a group of bankers from different regions who had participated
in the clearing process. On the Genoese fairs they came only from different regions in Italy
(Endemann 1885, p. 179f.; Ehrenberg 1896, p. 232), in Lyon from France, Germany and
Italy (Gascon 1971, pp. 244f.).11 The regulations of Besancon state that exchange rates
should be reasonable. However, based on these rates, other market prices were negotiated
ex post (Ehrenberg 1896, p. 234f.). Having participants from different regions set exchange
rates collectively was also typical for later regulations. In Frankfurt, where the fixing of
the exchange rate can be documented from 1585 onwards, in 1625 legislation was passed
after some bankers at previous fair meetings tried to manipulate exchange rates in their
favor; it was stated that the exchange rates were to be decided by local exchange brokers
7It is not clear if this was all public or happened in a bilateral way: see Ehrenberg 1896, p. 234; Martens
1794, p. 16 Neuhaus 1892, p. 8; Prausnitz 1928, p. 17; Endemann 1886, p. 176; Bru¨bach 1994, p. 175.
8See the reports by Scaccia and de Turri, see Endemann 1886, p. 176. For the same practice already in
use in Lyon eralier on see Gascon 1971, pp. 243f. and later on see Haristoy 1906, p. 304, in Frankfurt,
Brunswick and Leipzig fairs. See Bru¨bach 1994, p. 310.
9This was reported by de Turri, Peri, and Scaccia. See Endemann 1886, p. 177, Ehrenberg 1896, p. 234.
10The rejection of bills can already be documented for fairs of Lyon during the second half of the 15th
century. See Haristoy 1906 pp. 297f.
11De Rubys 1604 reports this procedure already for the Lyon fairs during the 16th century. See Vigne
1903, p. 121.
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and merchant bankers from different regions (Ehrenberg 1896, pp. 246f. Bru¨bach 1994, p.
287, 311ff.).
In the next step, merchants started the actual clearing process, sometimes with the help
of brokers.12 This process was organized as a decentralized searching and matching proce-
dure. The codified legal rules in various cities are rather cryptic in describing the process.
13 However, contemporary witnesses give a very lively picture of merchant bankers who
were in search of finding clearing partners during the clearing time.14 Only in Lyon during
the 15th and 16th century was the clearing done by two representatives of the official author-
ities (Ehrenberg 1896, p. 76). The decentralized clearing algorithm worked the following
way. First merchant bankers offset their positions in a reciprocal way. So if merchant
banker A owed B and B at the same time owed A, the common amount could be directly
cancelled out.15 In the next step merchants tried to find clearing cycles and clearing chains.
In a clearing cycle, for example, A owed B, B owed C, and C owed A a certain amount
of money. The common amount then could also be cancelled.16 In contrast, in a clearing
chain, where A owed B and B owed C, only B could clear his debts and the amount that
could be cancelled out had to be transferred into a new debt relationship between A and
C. These clearing mechanisms could easily include seven or eight parties (Koenigk 1727,
p. 66; Orth 1765, p. 481; p. E.B.A. 1773, p. 109f.). This clearing process was repeated
again and again. For example C could use the transferred debt in the chain and bring it into
another clearing chain or cycle. The sequential clearing can be documented in the ledger
by Masse in 1611 (Bru¨bach 1994, pp. 305f.). The clearing process lasted until the clearing
12The help of brokers can be documented for the German fairs in Frankfurt, Brunswick and Leipzig. See
Bru¨bach 1994, p. 316f.
13For example see the regulations of Frankfurt 1611; Brunswick 1686, 1715; Leipzig 1688, Breslau 1742;
see Prausnitz 1928, p. 23; Bru¨bach 1994, p. 170.
14Evidence can be found in de Turri and Scaccia for the earlier period. For the late 17th and 18th century
see Raumburger, Marberger, Riccius, Zipffel. On this see Endemann 1886, p. 178; Prausnitz 1928, pp.17,
23; Neuhaus 1892, p. 9.
15Scaccia and de Turri report this for the Genuose fairs. See Neuhaus 1892, p. 8, Prausnitz 1928, p. 17,
Endemann 1882, p. 177)
16For the Genovese fairs Peri gives an example. See Ehrenberg 1896, pp. 235f. For later fairs see, for
example, descriptions by Koenigk and Riccius. See Prausnitz 1928 p. 23; Neuhaus 1892, p. 35.
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time came to an end or no merchant could find another clearing partner since everybody
had reached his net position. In the exchange regulations, differentiated rules arose about
the constraints on participation in the clearing mechanism. In general, the rules gave the
merchants the freedom to choose the clearing cycle or chains in which they wanted to par-
ticipate. de Turri mentions this as an early practice. In addition, we can find the clause that
everybody needs to agree to the specific clearing group in most of the exchange laws from
the 17th century.17 All these sources imply preferences of merchants over participation in
different clearing cycles or chains. A writer of a merchant handbook in 1773 reports on the
rationale behind this. The author writes “you need to be careful not replacing a good debtor
with a bad debtor” (E.B.A. 1773, p. 112). Another regulation that indicates different pref-
erences over the order of clearing procedures is legislation from Frankfurt in 1666 where
bankers can first offset their liabilities before those of the customers that they represent
(Bru¨bach 1994, p. 176).
After the mutual netting was finished, merchants had to check if they still had outstand-
ing credits or debts. All mutual settlements had to have been written in their scartefacci
and having all participants do this made the clearing official.18 In general all transfers made
by the mechanism were final. This meant if a debtor was transferred to a new creditor, the
old creditor was no longer liable.19 Only in Besancon was it customary practice that ev-
erybody within a clearing chain or cycle was collectively liable.20 Legislation ensured that
the payment of debts through the clearing mechanism had the same legal status as paying
cash.21 Even when it turned out ex post that one merchant was bankrupt, priority was given
17See for example the exchange rules from Frankfurt from 1666, Leipziger exchange orders 1688, Prussian
exchange orders 1684, the orders of Bozen 1634 , Brunswick 1715, Augsburg 1716 or the descriptions by
Raumburger and Marberger, Riccius. See Neuhaus 1892, p. 29; Prausnitz 1928, p. 22.
18de Turri mentions this regulation and for later fairs also Koenigk, Raumberger, Marberger; see Prausnitz
1928, p. 17f. The regulations can be found in the statutes from Lyon 1667, Leipzig 1688, 1715, Breslau,
Augsburg, Bozen: see Neuhaus 1892, p. 12, 31, 38; Prausnitz 1928, p. 17f., 23; Bru¨bach 1994, p. 314f.
19For example see the clauses from Frankfurt 1666, Leipzig 1688, Breslau, Brunswick 1686, 1715 or
reports by Riccius, Marberger, and Koenigk. See Prausnitz 1928, p. 24.
20Contemporary witnesses Fabiani and Merenda inform us about that: Ehrenberg 1896, pp. 235f.; Neuhaus
1892 p. 40; Bru¨bach 1994, p. 318.
21For example see the exchange orders of Frankfurt 1611, for 1666; Frankfurt 1666, Lyon 1667, Bozen
1634, Brunswick 1686, Leipzig 1688 or the contemporary witnesses Franck and Phoonsen: Neuhaus 1892,
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to the debts that were settled by the mechanism.22 Factually, this meant that the payment
could not be reversed. This way the mechanism was protected from an ex post unravelling
of the settled debts.
In the next step the remaining debts would be settled. Controversial bills which had
been rejected by the debtors were judged by the local court (Ehrenberg 1896, p. 236). The
payment of outstanding debts could be in cash or by drawing new bills with promises on
future payments within a fixed period.23 In Augsburg 1778 it was forbidden to draw new
bills on one’s own name; only cash was allowed (Neuhaus, p. 32). Strict regulations were
applied in case a debtor did not offset the outstanding debts by the end of the clearing days:
Scaccia and de Turri wrote that participants who did not pay were excluded and declared
bankrupt (Endemann 1886, p. 178; Neuhaus 1892, p. 9, Prausnitz 1928, p. 19).24 Because
of this, Scacchia concluded that merchant bankers with positive positions could easily find
new debtors for their money (Endemann 1886, p. 175).
By the end of the Besancon fair a general balance was produced by the officials to
control the clearing. However such a general balance was not in use on other clearing
locations (Endemann 1886 p. 177; Biener 1859 p. 50).
2.3 Further Development: Exchange Banks, Endorsement, Stock Ex-
change and Clearing Clubs
From the late Middle Ages there were attempts to establish public exchange banks, whose
major task was to serve as clearing houses. This goes back to the first efforts in Venice
during the 14th and 15th century with the implementation in 1578 of the Rialto Bank and
even earlier by the establishment of exchange banks in several towns in Spain; the first
p. 40; Bru¨bach 1994, p. 171, 374.
22See the Besancon regulations, the Statuti di Genoa 1589, Lyon 1667, Leipzig 1688, the Frankfurt legis-
lation 1611, 1666: Neuhaus 1892 p. 8, 40; Bru¨bach 1994, p. 171, 309.
23See the statutes of Besancon and Frankfurt 1666, and the contemporary witnesses de Turri, Raumburger
and Franck: Endemann 1886, p. 178; Neuhaus 1892, p. 8, Biener 1859, p. 47; Prausnitz 1928, p. 18 u. 30;
Bru¨bach, p. 175f.
24This practice was also already known in Lyon. See Vigne 1904, p. 126; Haristoy 1906, p. 300. Addi-
tionally, in the regulations from 1667 strict payment periods were fixed. See Haristoy 1906, pp. 305f.
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was in Barcelona in 1401 (Usher 1943; Braudel 1966; Lane and Mueller 1985). The ex-
clusive right was given to most of these banks to handle the exchange business. However
from the fragmented data we possess we know that merchants were not interested in using
these centralized institutions to balance their positions. After the founding of the bank in
Venice, in 1593 a regulation was passed which forbade the use of the rescontre technique;
all bills had to be brought to the Bank. This regulation was later rescinded and decentral-
ized clearing was allowed again (Lattes 1869, pp. 170f.). North of the Alps, efforts to
install public clearing locations did not start until the beginning of the 17th century. The
first bank was the Wisselbank of Amsterdam in 1609 (Van Dillen 1934; van der Wee 1977;
de Vries and van der Woude 1997), which was a copy of the bank in Venice. More banks in
the Netherlands were established during the 17th century, as well in Germany at Hamburg
in 1619 and Nuremberg in 1621 (Sieveking 1934; Fuchs 1954). The success of these in-
stitutions was rather mixed. Whereas the Amsterdam exchange bank was a big success as
a multifunctional institution, its role as exclusive clearing bank had to be legally enforced
again and again. Even when the service was inexpensive or, until 1683, free, merchants
were not willing to use the institution (van Dillen 1964, p.398; Sneller 1940, pp. 157-160).
When the bank started its activities, private cashiers were forbidden to conduct the clearing
business, but by 1621 the decision was reversed. In 1700 merchants were forced up to an
amount of 600 and later 300 guilders to use the bank (van Velden 1933). In Hamburg in
1693 they were forced to use the bank for amounts higher than 400 marks. Merchants were
not allowed to use the direct clearing procedure (Prausnitz 1928, p. 26). In Nuremberg,
bank orders from 1654 and 1721 inform us that merchants were not allowed to use the
Skontration to settle their bills, but had to bring them to the exchange bank. In addition, the
orders from 1654 indicate that merchants were only willing to hand in the bills which they
could not clear easily or that were unbalanced positions (Neuhaus 1992, p. 12; Prausnitz,
p. 1928). However, decentralized clearing was again allowed later. In important clearing
locations such as Frankfurt or Leipzig no clearing banks were introduced, but merchant
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bankers relied on the decentralized practice in use. A similar story can be told for Lyon,
France’s main clearing location, where several efforts to install a central bank before the
18th century failed (Velde 2009). One of the main reasons was a lack of trust in the ac-
tivities of the bank. This can also be documented in the case of the banks of Nuremberg
(Fuchs 1954, pp. 55-58).
Another important innovation which influenced the Skontration was the more frequent
use of the endorsement of bills during the 16th and 17th century. Tradability of bills goes
back to the late Middle Ages and can be documented for the 14th century (Munro 1994;
Opitz 1967 , van der Wee 1993). Thus it was quite natural for the decentralized clearing
locations to be confronted with transferred bills. The reaction to these bills was different
from place to place. In Antwerp, with the growth of economic activities during the early
16th century, the transfer of financial instruments became standard and the court confirmed
the use of transferable bills several times during the late 16th and early 17th century (van
der Wee 1977, pp. 149-63). In Frankfurt, legislation went a different way (Schneider 1991,
Bru¨bach 1994, p. 171-4). The court declared, probably based on requests by fair bankers
in 1620 and 1635, that the usage of the endorsed bills was forbidden since it brought abuse,
disorder and confusion into the clearing mechanism. Only in 1666 after vehement protests
by merchants who were accustomed to the endorsement technique from the financial cen-
ters of Europe like Lyon and Antwerp was the judgement annulled. However, a regulation
from Lyon 1678 restricted the use of transfered bills from the Italian towns of Venice and
Bozen (Haristoy 1906, pp. 309f.). This was probably due to the fact that these exchange
places did not allow for endorsement (Schneider 1991, pp152f.). Hence, the town offi-
cals from Lyon feared disorder in the clearing mechanism. A similar story of resistance
to the endorsement technique as documented in Frankfurt can be reported from Italian fair
locations. The reason for this opposition could be seen in the strong lobbying of the well-
established bankers of these fairs since the use of the endorsed bills reduced the need of the
exchange fairs (Prausnitz 1928, p. 21; Neuhaus 1892 p. 11, Schneider 1991, pp. 150-3).
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The reduction of this need due to the endorsement was noted by Raumburger in 1723 (p.
671).
Similar decentralized clearing procedures appeared in the first stock exchange markets.
In Amsterdam, traders of stocks and futures started to meet informally during the 1630s,
probably once every month to offset their credits and debts in the form of stocks and futures
(Geldbloom and Jonker 2005, pp. 204f.). Probably from the 1650s onwards the Amsterdam
exchange established fixed clearing days every fourth month to settle mutual obligations.
Furthermore, during the 18th century speculators in English funds created their own clearing
days, also four times a year. (Wilson 1941, p. 83ff.). Finally, in London, regular clearing
days were introduced, probably during the 1740s. However, also in London, traders met
informally earlier in coffeehouses to offset their liabilities (Dickson 1967, p. 507ff.).
Another development we find is that national clearing clubs were introduced during the
late 18th and 19th centuries between banking houses. It has been documented that some
merchants attempted to establish clearing clubs at exchange fairs. In Frankfurt in 1642, 23
merchant bankers decided to meet regularly to clear their liabilities. Similar efforts can al-
ready be documented by Italian bankers, who started small clearing fairs during the 1570s,
when the Spanish bankruptcy led to uncertainty among the merchant bankers (Denzel 1994,
pp. 316f).
Such agreements can be found by banking houses to clear liabilities in the late 18th
century. In London in 1775, several private bankers agreed to build a clearing club, the
London Clearinghouse, to settle their liabilities. Before this agreement, bankers had to
present checks to each other and to settle individually. Anecdotal evidence suggest that
cash messengers from different banks first met informally over breakfast and offset the
liabilities so that they only had to cash in the unbalanced positions later on.
The clearing procedure was very similar to the procedure known from the clearing
fairs. Each morning during the week the representatives of the banks met and presented the
financial obligations. During the day the representatives had time to verify the debts. In
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case the obligations were approved, the representatives offset their credits and debts. The
remaining open positions had to be paid in cash (Seyd 1872, pp. 52ff.). The idea of such
a clearing club was taken up during the 19th century in Dublin in 1845, in New York in
1853, Paris and Vienna in 1872, and Berlin in 1884 (Koch 1983).
2.4 Efficiency of the Mechanism: Evidence from Merchant Books and
Contemporary Witnesses
Having outlined the historical evolution of these clearing mechanisms, it remains to be
answered whether or not these mechanisms were efficient in the sense that a high clearing
rate could be achieved without paying cash or writing new bills if not necessary. The
existence of the mechanism across Europe and the preference by merchants to use the
mechanism instead of central public exchange banks indicates that this institutional solution
must have worked relatively well. In addition, the large numbers of bills cleared this way
gives further evidence (Ehrenberg 1896) that these clearing fairs were successful. It seems
that only the economic or political abuse of the institution by manipulating exchange rates
or delaying payment or bankruptcy of some major merchant bankers or economic crises
led to a downturn of these decentralized clearing mechanisms.25
Another way to approach this question is to analyze one of the few scartefacci which
was handed down. The ledger of the 1632 autumn fair in Frankfurt of the merchant banker
Johan Bodeck gives detailed evidence of the clearing process at work (Bru¨bach 1994, pp.
331f.). Bodeck was involved with 77 people during the whole clearing process. This con-
tained reciprocal clearing, cycles, and chains. These merchants and bankers were from all
over Europe north of the Alps. Clearing partners came from Aachen, Amsterdam, Augs-
burg, Breslau, Dresden, Frankfurt, Hamburg, Leipzig, Strasbourg, Ulm and from unknown
locations. During the clearing, he transacted the total amount of 135,000 florins, but only
4,000 florins were paid in cash. The rest could be compensated via the clearing procedure.
25See Vasquez de Prada 1991, pp. 121-125 for the Castilian fairs; Denzel 1994, 311ff. for Lyon and the
Italian fairs.
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Thus, more than 99.3% could be cleared by mutual settlement. Taking this single booklet
as a sample, the clearing technique was very successful. However, can we generalize this
single case study or was this high clearing rate pure chance?
Another approach is to analyze the reports of the contemporary witnesses. Whereas an
early witness, the merchant Davanzati in 1560 commenting on Besancon looked with some
ridicule at the mechanism (Ehrenberg, p. 229), writers of the 17th and 18th century, such
as Sotus, Molina, Azorius, Scaccia, and de Turri admired the clearing process. Scaccia
and de Turri write that nothing was rarer than money at these clearing fairs (Endemann
1886, pp. 178f.; Neuhaus 1892, p. 10; Haristoy 1906, p. 300).26 Merchant bankers only
brought money for their expenses. Only Koenigk, Raumburger, and Marberger (Prausnitz
1928, p. 25) mentioned with the emergence of exchange banks that they were surprised
that not more places had a centralized exchange bank since they were better than the de-
centralized clearing procedure. Based on these reports, the mechanism must have been
rather successful.
However if the mechanism was so successful and led to a high clearing rate, why did
some of the regulations force merchants to participate and not to pay cash in advance?
Why did the statutes mention the freedom of merchants over the order and the clearing
partnerships in which they could be involved? If the mechanism worked that well why did
merchants have preferences about clearing different clearing chains and cycles? Could the
endorsement of the bills of exchange have been so vulnerable for the mechanism in use?
We now turn to a theoretical model of the mechanism to answer these questions.
26De Rubys and Clairac argues in a similar way for the Lyon fairs; see Haristoy 1906, p. 300 Gascon 1971,
p. 248.
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3 A Model of Medieval Debt Trading
3.1 Setup
We consider a model with a set N = {1, ..., N} of agents. Each agent i ∈ N is en-
dowed with a set of debts di,1, di,2, ...di,N ≥ 0 where di,j represents the debt that i owes
j (and where di,i ≡ 0). We call the complete characterization of a set of debts and cred-





the trader i’s net position: if i’s net position is 0, we shall call his position balanced.
We will only consider mechanisms that leave unchanged every trader’s net position.
Hence, each trader’s utility is defined only over the total number of outstanding commit-





where αi,j is the disutility for agent i of holding a debt from agent j. Note that this can vary
between agents; some agent j may be a good credit risk for i and have a low αi,j , while
some other agent k may be a poor credit risk, and hence αi,k will be quite large. We also
assume that the utility of the trader is just a total of the disutility of each credit he is holding
from other agents.
In this context, a Pareto efficient allocation is any allocation that maximizes a weighted
sum of utilities. We also wish to consider the strategic implications of the mechanisms used.
At a fair, an announced debt had to be confirmed by the presumptive debtor. Hence, strate-
gic considerations are important: mechanisms that allow manipulation by denying debts
(which the debtor can then pay off later) must not improve outcomes for the manipulator:
otherwise, the merchants will have an incentive to deny debts during the clearing process,
which may ruin the ability of these debt clearing mechanisms to function efficiently.
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Therefore, we will assume that agents have the ability to deny a debt: that is, for any
di,j > 0, agent i can deny the debt, and the mechanism must proceed as if di,j = 0.
Formally, the strategy set of the agent i (for a given allocationA) will consist of confirming
or denying di,j for any di,j > 0. The mechanism will then proceed using the input allocation
A′, which is the allocation including only confirmed debts.
3.2 The Case of Balanced Positions
We first consider the case when each agent i’s financial position is balanced, in the sense
that he is neither a net debtor or creditor: that is, for all i ∈ N, we have that
N∑
j=1
(di,j + dj,i) = 0






for all i ∈ N.
In this section we first wish to consider the cycle removal mechanism. For this mech-
anism, we search for a cycle of agents i1, i2, ..., iM , iM+1 = i1 where ia 6= ib for a 6= b,
a, b ∈ {1, ...,M} and da,a+1 > 0 for a = 1, ...M . Essentially, we are looking for a cy-
cle of agents, each of whom owes the next agent a positive amount. We then “clear”the




and subtracting dˆ from dia,ia+1 for all
a = 1, ...,M . While the cycle removal clearing mechanism obviously applies to the case
when only cycles are cleared, it also incorporates the case where merchants were required
to pay cash at the fair so that the ending positions were balanced.
Note that we have not defined in what order the cycle removal mechanism removes
cycles. However, the exact order of the cycle removal does not concern us, as it does not
affect the final outcome:
Proposition 1. If all agents have a balanced position, any cycle removal mechanism will
completely clear all debts and hence is efficient.
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The essence of the proof lies in accounting: if some agent i has a debt, then the agent
j to whom i owes a debt owes a debt in turn to someone else, as his position is balanced.
Since all positions are balanced, this string of logic can be continued until a cycle is found;
there are only N agents, so at some point this chain must bend back in on itself.
Since, with balanced positions, all debts are cleared, we have that it is a Nash equilib-
rium for agents to truthfully reveal all their debts, since if they reveal all of their debts, they
will completely clear all of their positions, which maximizes their utility.
Proposition 2. If all agents have a balanced position, it is a Nash equilibrium to reveal all
debts.
The easiest way that an agent could misstate his position is by not entering the cycle-
clearing mechanism at all. However, since the proposition states it is a Nash equilibrium to
truthfully reveal all of one’s debts, it is a Nash equilibrium for all traders to enter the mech-
anism, a corollary of the above result is that all agents will wish to enter the mechanism.
Corollary 1. If all agents have a balanced position, it is a Nash equilibrium for all agents
to enter the mechanism.
3.3 Unbalanced positions
However, if agents do not have balanced positions, the nice properties of cycle removal
mechanisms break down. First, a particular cycle removal mechanism will not necessarily
be even Pareto efficient, much less efficient in the sense of minimizing the total remaining
debts. Consider the example in Figure 1 below, where each arrow denotes the owing of 100
florins: e.g., A owes E and B, and is owed by D, etc., and suppose that αi,j ≡ α for all
i, j. Then a cycle removing mechanism may well choose to remove the cycleA,B,C,D,A
first, after which no more cycles can be removed. Note that each agent in the removed cycle
has one 100 florin open position after the cycle clears, and the two agents not involved, E














Figure 1: A diagram of a possible allocation. An arrow from i to j represents di,j = 100.
not clear their accounts using just cycles, as their creditor is a net creditor and their debtor
is a net debtor.
On the other hand, if the cycle A,E,D,A is removed, then the only remaining cycle
is B,C, F,B; after removing these two cycles, only agents A,B,C, and D have open
positions of 100 florins. So while the four agents A,B,C, and D may be indifferent, both
E and F would be better off if the mechanism removed the smaller cycles first.27 Hence,
as the financial positions of fairgoers becomes more complex, we would expect additions
to, or a wholly different mechanism from, the cycle removal mechanism that works well
when all positions are balanced.
Hence, we now consider chain removal mechanisms. A chain removal mechanism is,
in a certain sense, simpler than a cycle removal mechanism: whenever we find a sequence
of agents i1, i2, i3 such that di1,i2 > 0 and di2,i3 > 0, we call this a chain. For any chain,
we let d = min {di1,i2 , di2,i3} and subtract d from both. If i1 6= i3 we also add d to di1,i3 .
Hence, since i1’s debt is passed onto i3, the net positions of the three agents do not change.
For example, if A owes B 100 florins, and B owes C 60 florins, and A owes C 20 florins,
then we rearrange the debts so that A owes B 100 − 60 = 40 florins, and A owes C
20+ 60 = 80 florins, but B no longer owes C any florins. The result of any chain removal
is to set either di1,i2 or di2,i3 to zero; of course, it may increase di1,i3 from zero to d. Note,
however, that it reduces the total open debt by at least d, as both di1,i2 and di2,i3 fall by d
27Note that the fact that we wish to remove the smaller cycles first in this example does not generalize. In
particular, note that if we replaced E with a chain of several agents, it would be better to remove the larger
cycle first.
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(and di1,i3 increases by at most d).
We have not defined the order in which we remove chains. One type of chain removal
mechanism is that which removes cycles first, and only afterwards removes chains. The
transfer of debts could explain such preferences by merchants. Indeed, the chain removal
mechanism can be considered an extension of the cycle removal mechanism. For instance,
first using a cycle removal mechanism and then removing the remaining chains (in any
order), would still be a chain removal mechanism: we can simply consider removing the
cycle as removing the chains in a particular order, as the cycle i1, i2, ..., iM can be thought
of as consisting of the chains i1, i2, i3, then i2, i3, i4, etc.
Furthermore, the chain removal mechanism is exactly what is necessary in order to
reduce each trader’s position to only debts or only credits, even when positions are unbal-
anced:
Proposition 3. Any chain removal mechanism will result in each trader having only debts
or only credits.
The idea of the proof is straightforward: if some agent has both a credit and a debt, we
can use these to find a chain.
Note, however, that the chain removal mechanism is not deterministic: if positions are
unbalanced, then different allocations can result from the same starting point, depending
on the order of the removal of the chains. Consider the case when A and A′ both owe B
50 florins, who in turn owes C 50 florins. Then, depending on the order of chain removal,
either A or A′ will owe C 50 florins, while the other will still owes B 50 florins.
Hence, when merchants have preferences over their debtors, it is not necessarily the
case that removing a chain results in a Pareto superior allocation; removing a particular
chain may make one of the traders worse off, as he now has a debtor whom he disprefers.
In particular, then, if positions are unbalanced (and cash payments to settle positions are
not required) and merchants have strong preferences over their debtors, the mechanism
may fail to induce much clearing, as merchants will not allow chains to clear which leave
23
them with worse debtors. For instance, C may prefer A as a debtor to A′, while B prefers
A′ to A. Then if we clear the A′, B, C chain, the resulting allocation will be Pareto inferior
to the allocation where we clear the A,B,C chain.
In particular, it may be the case that an agent may not wish to allow certain cycles to
clear, so as to avoid exchanging a debt with one member of the mechanism for another. In
Figure 1 above, then, if B does not wish to hold a debt from C or F , it is important that
he be able to keep the A,B,C,D,A cycle from clearing, as then he can ensure that the
B,C, F cycle clears instead. If he did not have this option, then the mechanism would
suffer, as then B would have an incentive to deny his debt to C, so as to ensure that the
cycles he prefers are the ones to clear.
Another motivation for wishing to choose the cycles that clear is that the merchant may
have preferences due to the exchange rates that were used for the clearing. It may be that
clearing a particular chain would force the merchant to exchange debts at what the merchant
perceives is an unfavorable exchange rate. Hence, at fairs where debts of several currencies
are exchanged, it is even more important to give merchants the freedom to choose which
chains clear in order to ensure willingness to participate in the mechanism.
However, when agents do not have preferences over which debts they hold, the chain
removal mechanism has even stronger strategic properties than the cycle removal mech-
anism: in particular, it is an optimal strategy for all players, regardless of the actions by
other players, to truthfully reveal their debts.
Proposition 4. Suppose that αi,j = α for all i, j ∈ N. Then it is a (weakly) dominant
strategy for all agents to truthfully reveal their debts under a chain removal mechanism.
Furthermore, the resulting allocation is Pareto optimal.
The key idea here is that the removal of any given chain can only help the individuals
involved. When removing a given chain A,B,C, the utility of A and C remains the same.
However, the utility of B is increased by αd, where d = min {dA,B, dB,C}. Hence, all
three agents within the chain or at least weakly better off when the chain clears. This
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proposition applies particularly to the case where merchants participate in a clearing club,
where the assumption that the disutility from a debt is the same across club members is
reasonable to apply.
4 Discussion of the Results in Historical Context
We now consider these theoretical results in their economic and historical context. Theory
predicts efficient outcomes if participants are willing to get involved in clearing chains and
clearing cycles. If this is the case a merchant who participates in the clearing mechanism
can clear all his debts and credits up to his net position as long as everyone else partici-
pates. Hence, we can rationalize the decentralized search and matching procedure as the
decentralized nature of these institutions did not impede their efficiency. Furthermore, a
merchant can clear his debts and credits in any order. If the composition of the liabilities
of the bills allows several clearing paths, then the clearing order does not matter. There-
fore, all we need for the success of the clearing is that the merchants meet at a specific
time and work through the various chains and cycles: no centralized authority is necessary.
This is what we found as customary practice earlier on and later regulated in the exchange
laws. Crucial in this process is that no questionable bills be used since this would destroy
the clearing sequence. Thus, the common practice in the legislation to sort out these bills
ex ante can be explained. The fear of using endorsed bills can also be interpreted along
this line. As long as the legislation and the enforcement of these liabilities were not clear,
endorsed bills could bring disorder into the mechanism as judged by the Frankfurt court.
The willingness of a merchant to participate in a clearing cycle or clearing chain ex ante
depends on the expectations of balanced positions ex post or in case of expected unbalanced
positions on the likelihood that a creditor gets paid in cash or makes a satisfactory deal
by drawing on new bills. If either of these conditions is satisfied, he will participate in
any clearing cycle or chain. We can understand the strong fair regulations on balancing
positions for example in Besancon or Lyon, i.e. paying cash before the end of the fair
25
and otherwise being declared bankrupt and excluded from any future clearing processes,
since this increases the willingness of the wealthy merchants to participate in the clearing
mechanism. However, if a merchant expects unbalanced positions at the end, for example if
he learns that many merchant bankers will not be able to balance their debts, he will stick to
clearing cycles since this guarantees him direct clearing; even a bankrupt clearing partner ex
post will not harm him according to the regulations discussed earlier on. If he selects chains
he must be careful not to pick a new partner who, as is written in the merchant booklet, turns
out to be a bad debtor. If he prefers using cycles only, he might have preferences over the
order of the clearing process, since this can determine the outcome and his personal clearing
rate by only using cycles. Consequently, we can rationalize all the regulations we found in
the exchange legislations which gave the merchant the freedom to participate in any cycle
or chain, and to choose in which ordering he liked to clear, as otherwise a merchant may
have incentives to misreport his positions in order to change his eventual set of debtors or
not to participate at the clearing mechanism at all. Following this line of argument, we
can also understand why merchants sometimes preferred clearing debts in cash, since they
preferred receiving cash ex ante from the original debtor to trying to cash in the debts from
a new debtor due to the clearing process. At the same time the officials who organized the
clearing fair had an interest in keeping in as many debtor-creditor pairs as possible because
this created positive externalities for other merchants who participated in the clearing. The
discussed regulations from Bozen or Leipzig on forced participation can be rationalized in
this way.
In addition, the use of strict regulations that forced participants after the mutual settle-
ment to balance their positions can be explained. In an early stage, when such a mech-
anism was set up by a small number of merchants, we can expect reputational forces to
have kept the mechanism running. However, when the number of participants increased, it
was necessary to impose legal sanctions. An alternative to this are clearing clubs, where
the number of participants is restricted to merchants who know each other. However, the
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clearing mechanism allows some anonymity. As long as merchants only participate in cy-
cles it does not matter if they need to rely on reputation or legal enforcement ex post since
the common amount can be cleared anyway. In addition, in clearing cycles and clearing
chains each participant knows at least one partner with whom he had already done business.
Finally, in case one participant rejected a certain clearing chain, he still could search for
other clearing partners to proceed with the clearing. Achieving a Pareto efficient clearing
depends then on the number of theoretical clearing paths available and on the original lia-
bility composition and structure of the merchants. More broadly, the observed mechanism
is an institutional solution of an economic world in transition from a reputation-based sys-
tem to a more anonymous trade-based system with limited centralized outside enforcement
options (Greif 2002, 2006).
Furthermore, the mechanism is rather robust and we can expect high clearing rates.
The question then remains under which circumstances the mechanism becomes vulnerable.
The mechanism is robust against small shocks and the bigger the clearing location, the
less likely it is that small disturbances will influence the clearing process. However, the
mechanism is not robust against heavy shocks as we can observe for example during the
second half of the 16th century in Lyon. If too many merchants cannot pay their debts, then
participants can not only expect unbalanced positions, but also a shortage of money on the
aftermarket, since too few bankers come out of the clearing with positive net positions.
Furthermore, we can expect less willingness to give future credit to probably bad creditors.
Observing the empirical success and the theoretical efficiency of the decentralized
clearing mechanism explains the limited success of the early public clearing banks. A
clearing bank can always replicate the efficient clearing because it works as an intermedi-
ary who takes in and hands out the compensation directly. However if we expect efficient
or close to efficient clearing using the decentralized clearing procedure, what extra benefits
can the central bank offer to the merchants? The public bank can work as an intermedi-
ary who enforces unbalanced positions. In contrast to the decentralized clearing house, a
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creditor can always rely on the same partner and does not have to deal each time with new
debtors, who are determined by the sequence of the decentralized clearing process. The
bank orders of Nuremberg imply such a rationale by their customers. The merchants of
Nuremberg were willing to hand in bills which they could not clear easily; for these bills,
they preferred to rely on the enforcement of the bank. However, the document also informs
us that they handed in only these bills; decentralized clearing for the other bills was still
preferred. The enforced participation constraints by other banks also point in this direc-
tion. A follow-up question can then be asked: why did merchants prefer not to go to these
public banks? We see from sources that document the early phases of these institutions
that some exchange banks were chronically short of money. Furthermore, town officials,
who governed these banks, were always passing new regulations for these banks (Fuchs
1954, pp. 55-8). Therefore, the unwillingness of merchants to deposit all of their bills
into these banks comes as no surprise. During the early 18th century Marberger (1717, pp.
98f.) comments on this problem (Schneider 1991, p. 142). In addition, by using these new
public institutions, merchants would have to reveal certain private business information to
these banks, and in many cases the merchants probably did not wish to do so (Velde 2009).
Finally, at fairs exchange rates were negotiated by representatives of different merchant
groups. In the public banks merchants had to rely on the decision makers of the bank.
Thus, based on this bargaining argument the participants of the fairs could expect better
exchange rates at exchange fairs than in public banks. Consequently the later success of
the exchange banks must be explained by a slow evolution of trust in these new central-
ized institutions and other complementary institutional advantages which go beyond the
clearing mechanisms (for example see Quinn 2006, 2007).
5 Conclusion
This paper examined the evolution of a decentralized multilateral debt clearing algorithm
for non- or limited-tradable debts during the late medieval and early modern period in
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Europe. We constructed a simple theoretical model of the mechanism and showed that
the mechanism could lead to very high clearing rates. In this way the common use of the
mechanism can be rationalized.
We first examined the history of the mechanism. We analyzed the early emergence of
this mechanism on Late Medieval markets and fairs and showed how the clearing algo-
rithm developed into a standardized procedure embedded in a legal framework during the
early modern period in use all over Europe. We identified the main elements of the pro-
cedure, based on legal sources and writings of contemporary witnesses. We then set up a
model which simulates the mechanism and identifies the equilibrium outcomes and related
strategic behavior of participants.
We showed that the functioning of the mechanisms depends on the balance of positions
of merchants ex ante and the use of clearing cycles or clearing chains. If positions are
balanced, then efficient clearing is always achievable with clearing cycles and also with
clearing chains. If positions are unbalanced, it is necessary to use not only cycles but also
clearing chains. Furthermore, whereas in the case of balanced positions the algorithm is
deterministic, in case of unbalanced positions it is not. If cycles are used, depending on in
which order the cycles are removed, different levels of clearing efficiencies can be achieved.
If chains are used, merchants can always reduce their position to being solely a creditor
or debtor, but depending on the clearing order the distribution of debt transfers among
merchants differs ex post. These properties can lead to strategic behavior of merchants in
the form of strategic misrepresentation of information and non-willingness to participate in
specific cycles or chains. This in turn reduces the efficiency of the clearing.
These results can explain the self-organizing emergence of this mechanism during the
late Middle Ages in fair and financial markets and why during the early modern period a
specific form of the mechanism embedded in a legal framework evolved all over Europe.
In addition, it can be shown why the mechanism was in general robust and only vulnera-
ble in cases of strong economic shocks or of political abuse. This made is it difficult for
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competing institutions such as the public exchange banks to take over the clearing business.
These results open up new questions for future research. The results here analyze the
microeconomic properties of these clearing mechanisms. However interesting questions
related to trade and credit flows on a macroeconomic level could be discussed. It is well
known that all these clearing locations were linked and embedded in a common network.
Therefore the evolution and robustness of this network related to the microeconomic find-
ings of this paper should be further discussed. In particular, the role of unbalanced trade
and credit flows would be of great interest.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Proposition 1
Suppose not. Then after all cycles have been removed, there exists some agent i1 who has
both debts and credits. Hence, for at least one individual i2, we have that
di1,i2 > 0
37
Since this is true for every agent i, for any agent ia with dia−1,ia > 0, there exists an agent
ia+1 such that dia,ia+1 > 0, as ia holds a balanced position. Hence, we can construct an
ordered list of agents i1, i2, ..., iN , iN+1 for whom dia,ia+1 > 0. Since there are N + 1
agents in this list, there must be an a and b such that 1 ≤ a < b ≤ iN+1 such that ia = ib.
Hence, there still exists a cycle ia, ia+1, ..., ib−1, ia = ib, which contradicts the assumption
that all cycles have been removed.
7.2 Proposition 2
If all other agents truthfully reveal, it follows from Proposition 1 that agent i will clear all
his debts by truthfully revealing. Since this is the best agent i can hope to do under any
allocation, this is a best response.
7.3 Proposition 3
Assume that all chains are removed and the outcome is not efficient. Then there exists
an agent i whose has both a debt with some agent j and is owed a debt by some agent h.
Hence, h, i, j constitutes a chain and not all chains have been removed, a contradiction.
7.4 Proposition 4
Let A′ be the allocation given a truthful revelation by agent i and some revelation by other
agents. Then a chain removal mechanism is strategy-proof if i does not want to deny his
debt with any j such that d′i,j > 0. Letting dˆ
′
i,j denote the announcement by i, we have that

















as di,j > 0 (as the agent can only deny debts). For the last statement, note from the previous
theorem that all agents when all agents report truthfully, all agents are reduced to their net
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positions. Since the disutility from any debtor is the same as from any other debtor, this
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